Introduction
Higher rates of welfare take-up among immigrants relative to natives can be observed in many developed countries. The risk of receiving means-tested welfare benefits in Germany is twice as high for migrants as it is for their native counterparts. 1 Immigrants are also overrepresented relative to the group of employed individuals in Germany. Official statistics on welfare use and employment for Germany show that approximately 22 percent of all employable individuals between 15 and 64 years who receive means-tested welfare benefits do not have German citizenship, while the share of migrants in the population of dependent employees amounts to only 8 percent. 2 The higher welfare take-up rates found in the raw official data often dominate political and public discussions about the benefits and risks of migration for host countries. In Germany, this discussion has emerged recently due to recent waves of immigrants to Germany from other EU countries, especially from Eastern Europe.
The question of whether immigrants use welfare more intensively than natives addresses two different mechanisms. First, immigrants may be more likely to be eligible for welfare due to their observable characteristics. Second, immigrants may have a higher inclination than natives to take up benefits conditional on being eligible. In addition to observed characteristics, unobserved characteristics may explain higher take-up rates and migration may have a positive effect on welfare dependence itself. Brücker et al. (2002) discuss different reasons for the higher welfare dependence of migrants, as they focus on non-EU citizens in European states. Potential sources of a migration effect in addition to other observable personal characteristics are discrimination, migration-specific effects (such as language skills or psychological problems), negative network effects or the reduced access to public jobs. Furthermore, self-selection may also lead to a higher welfare dependence of migrants if migration is influenced by the generosity of the welfare system. It may be assumed that states with generous welfare systems are especially attractive to individuals with a low earnings capacity, which depends on observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Then, selfselection into migration would lead to a higher risk of welfare dependence for immigrants depending on their observed and unobserved characteristics.
Most of the empirical economic literature on immigrant-native differences in welfare use is concerned with the first mechanism. These studies analyze whether the relatively higher welfare dependence of migrants found in aggregated data still remains when individual characteristics are controlled for. Brücker et al. (2002) analyze the determinants of welfare dependence for several EU-countries and for different types of benefits using the European Community Household Panel (1994) (1995) (1996) . For Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Austria and Finland they find a significant positive effect of being a non-EU citizen on the probability of receiving unemployment benefits. Anastassova/Paligorova (2006) focus on differences in social incomes -defined as the sum of various social benefits except pensions -between the households of natives, EU and non-EU immigrants in Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Germany and 1 See Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2009) . In that study migrants are defined as individuals without German citizenship who are not born in Germany or whose parents are foreigners and whose language spoken at home is not German.
2
In the official statistics migrants are defined as individuals without German citizenship (see statistics from the Federal Employment Agency at http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Startseite/StartseiteNav.html).
the U.S. They make use of data of the Luxembourg Income Study for the year 2000. They find larger differences between natives and non-EU immigrants than between natives and EU immigrants in some EU countries, which could mainly be explained by differences in the household composition (Sweden, Norway) or individual characteristics (Belgium). For Germany, their results indicate that the social income difference between immigrants and natives is negligible and not statistically significant, regardless of whether they focus on EU or non-EU immigrants. Barrett/McCarthy (2008) provide an overview of several studies on immigrant welfare use for the Unites States and Europe. In some countries, e.g. Germany, differences in welfare take-up between both groups disappear when welfare-related personal characteristics are controlled for. For Sweden, it seems that welfare dependence patterns differ between both groups even after controlling for observed characteristics. In a more recent study, Barrett/Maître (2013) analyze immigrant welfare receipt across a range of 19 European countries. Their descriptive analysis based on European Union statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) shows higher rates of receipt of unemployment support among non-EU immigrants in many countries. After controlling for individual observed characteristics, the marginal effect of being a migrant on the probability of receiving unemployment benefits is significant and positive in seven countries. Riphahn (1998) and Riphahn (2004) study the welfare take-up of immigrants in Germany. Both studies show that conditional on various control variables, immigrants are no more likely than citizens to receive welfare benefits. In a recent study Riphahn/Wunder (2014) analyze patterns of welfare dynamics among immigrants and natives. They conclude that the persistence in welfare receipt observed in the raw data in Germany is explained to a large extent by observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Only for the group of non-EU citizens, their results point to true state dependence with regard to welfare receipt after controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics.
In summary, the empirical evidence for Germany suggests that immigrants have a significantly higher risk than their native counterparts of being on welfare due to their observed characteristics, while there seems to be no additional migration effect after controlling for individual characteristics. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if immigrants are also more prone to take up benefits, conditional on being eligible. This question is important for political reasons. If reducing the welfare dependence of migrants is a policy goal under a given macroeconomic migration policy, two different policy implications follow from this two mechanisms. First, if higher welfare dependence is attributable to observed characteristics, then social policies to improve welfare recipients labor market prospects in general are challenged. Second, if higher welfare dependence is caused by a higher take-up conditional on being eligible, then reforming eligibility rules to reduce welfare dependence may be appropriate. This applies especially if path dependency is a key determinant of welfare dependence. Castronova et al. (2001) explicitly focus on this second mechanism behind higher welfare take-up rates. They analyze the take-up of social assistance in Germany by immigrants and natives, conditional on being eligible, and hence focus on take-up behavior rather than on determinants of eligibility. Their analysis builds on a cross-section of the German SocioEconomic Panel study (GSOEP) from the year 1996. We build on Castronova et al. (2001) and analyze the take-up behavior of individuals who are entitled to basic means-tested welfare benefits for employable persons in Germany. Our analysis differs from Castronova et al. (2001) in four points. First, we provide evidence of immigrant-native differences in welfare benefit take-up under the new welfare system in Germany after its reorganization in 2005 due to far reaching social policy reforms. Bruckmeier/Wiemers (2012) provide evidence that non-take-up of basic means-tested welfare benefits has changed after the reforms. Second, we apply a microsimulation model of the complete tax and transfer system in Germany to determine welfare eligibility rather than using only one income-and needs-equation. This approach is more appropriate because welfare entitlements in Germany not only depend on a household's income and needs but also on other means-tested entitlements that are prioritized over basic welfare benefits. Third, we extend the analysis of Castronova et al. (2001) to a panel framework and take into account individual unobserved heterogeneity. Fourth, we distinguish between different groups of immigrants.
Microsimulation Model and Data
To simulate welfare entitlements, we employ the Tax The IAB-STSM is a static microsimulation model that consists of a detailed implementation of the German tax and transfer system as well as an econometrically estimated labor supply model. The model is mainly used for the ex ante evaluation of social policy reforms directed at low-income households in Germany. Its validity with regard to official statistics and its robustness referring to model assumptions and data selection has been verified in several studies (Arntz et al., 2007; Blos et al., 2007; Wiemers/Bruckmeier, 2009; Bruckmeier/Wiemers, 2012) . The principal task of the IAB-STSM tax and transfer module is the computation of household net income under varying tax and transfer rules. Therefore, we use the gross incomes of the household, e.g., labor and capital incomes, as they can be found in the underlying data. All deductions from gross income and public transfers are simulated on the basis of the simulation model. Table  A1 in the appendix describes the incomes, taxes and other income deductions considered in the computation of net household income. Important for our analysis is the simulation of welfare entitlements. Figure 1 shows the calculation of the four nationwide means-tested benefits: 1) Social assistance for older and not employable persons (SGB XII), 2) social assistance for employable persons between 15 and 64 years (SGB II), 3) housing benefits and 4) the enhanced child benefits, which are prioritized over social assistance. This means that persons who are eligible for housing benefits and the enhanced child benefits and whose total entitlements from these two benefits are at least as high as the entitlement to social assistance would have to take-up the former benefits. The relevant institutions for our analysis are social assistance (SA) benefits for employable persons and for unemployable and older persons. In order to determine eligibility for SA, a person first has to be classified as either employable or not employable. The legal definition of employability is rather vague. 4 Thus, employability in the sense of the SGB II cannot be precisely determined using information from the GSOEP.
In the model, we categorize a person as employable if he or she is aged between 15 and 64, does not work in a sheltered workshop and either has a degree of disability smaller than 80% 5 or receives earned income. If a household is categorized as unemployable and passes the eligibility check for SGB XII benefits, the model compares the claim of SA to a possible claim of housing benefits. The model assumes that the household will take up the higher benefit. If, on the other hand, the household is classified as employable and passes the eligibility check for SGB II benefits, the model also checks eligibility for the so-called "children's allowance" (CA). Households are eligible for CA, if the parents income is high enough to cover their own basic needs (determined by the SGB II) but not the basic needs of children in the household. In the case of eligibility for CA, the model compares the sum of the CA and possible claims to housing benefits to SGB II benefits and again assumes that the household claims the greater benefit. A detailed description of the calculation of a households needs and income and hence the households's entitlements in the IAB-STSM is provided by Bruckmeier/Wiemers (2011). 4 The legal definition given in § 8(1) SGB II loosely states that a person is employable if illness or disability does not disable her to work at least three hours a day under the regular conditions of the labor market for the forseeable future. In practice, employability is determined by public health officers. 5 A disability degree of 80% is chosen to approximately calibrate the relative number of SGB II to SGB XII recipients in the model to the official numbers of SGB II and SGB XII recipients.
The IAB-STSM is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a representative yearly household panel study in Germany. 6 We make use of the GSOEP because the IAB-STSM is based on this dataset and it offers several advantages for our analysis. To simulate social assistance entitlements, information on several socio-demographic characteristics of the household members and on the household incomes are necessary, which are usually provided only in survey data like the GSOEP in Germany. Compared to other available survey data, the GSOEP has the advantage to allow us to exploit the panel structure of the data. Because the GSOEP was not designed for our specific research question, a potential drawback could be the small sample size when focusing on subgroups like immigrants who are eligible for social assistance. Although administrative research data on social assistance with large sample sizes exists, we cannot use this data because it covers only recipients of social assistance and not all eligible households, including non-take-up households. However, the GSOEP has the advantage that foreigners were oversampled in two special subsamples conducted in 1984 and 1995 to cover the immigration waves to Germany in the first decades after the Second World War and after the German reunification. Therefore, the GSOEP seems to be an appropriate database for our analysis.
We 
Simulation Results
Our simulation of welfare entitlements results in 35.4 million (weighted) households (5,960 household by year observations) that are eligible for social assistance benefits for employable persons (SGB II) and for non-employable and older persons (SGB XII) over all seven waves. Hence, on average about five million households are eligible per wave. Most households are eligible for SGB II benefits (approximately 90 percent), which can also be found in official statistics. 7 Following Castronova et al. (2001), we focus on first generation immigrantsi.e. individuals who have immigrated to Germany by themselves -only. 8 We distinguish between three groups of migrants among the first generation immigrants according to their current citizenship. The first group consists of (1) foreigners who have citizenship in an EU country or in a country related to the European Union. 9 The second group consists of all (2) migrants with foreign citizenship not included in the first measure (Non-EU citizenship). The last group consists of (3) individuals with German citizenship. All shares weighted and shown in percentages. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of equal shares of eligible households in subgroups compared to the group of natives (column 4) and rejection of the null hypothesis of equal rates of non-take-up compared to the group of natives (column 5) on the levels * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Source: GSOEP years 2005-2011, pooled data, IAB-STSM.
On average, approximately 12.7 percent of all households are eligible for social assistance. In particular, non-EU citizens and immigrants with a German citizenship show highly significant differences (1% level) in the share of eligible households compared to natives (38.5/23.3 percent versus 11.4 percent). Migrants with an EU citizenship only have a moderately higher but statistical insignificant share of eligible households (14.4 percent) than natives.
Looking at the rates of non-take-up of SA among the eligible households, Table 1 shows that approximately 42.5 percent of all eligible households do not claim their entitlements, according to our simulation results. The resulting rate of non-take-up is comparable to the results of Bruckmeier/Wiemers (2012), who find rates of non-take-up between 41 and 49 percent for the years 2005 to 2007 using the GSOEP data for SGB II and SGB XII benefits and those of Bruckmeier et al. (2013) , who report rates of non-take-up for SGB II benefits between 34 and 43 percent based on data of the German Income and Expenditure Survey 2008 (EVS). Our results further show that the rates of non-take-up vary considerably across the different migration groups and natives (between 36.7 and 49.6 percent). Nonetheless, pairwise t-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal rates of non-take-up for each of the three migrant groups compared to the group of natives on conventional levels.
Overall, the descriptive results point to substantial and statistically significant differences between migrant groups and natives for the likelihood of being eligible for SA. Additionally, we find considerable variation in the rates of non-take-up, possibly due to differences in the observable characteristics of these groups, as shown in Table A2 . However, the differences in the take-up rates turn out to be statistically insignificant. In the next sections, we test whether migration background has a significant impact on the probability of take-up after controlling for additional observed and unobserved household characteristics.
Estimation Approach
We follow the literature on welfare benefit take-up and analyze take-up behavior within a discrete choice framework (Blundell/Fry/Walker, 1988; Riphahn, 2001; Wilde/Kubis, 2005; Whelan, 2010; Bruckmeier/Wiemers, 2012) . Benefit take-up will be observed if the net level of utility from claiming a benefit exceeds the utility from not claiming the benefit. Because the decision to claim benefits hinges on unobservable factors, suitable observable proxies x for the utility and costs of claiming SA should be chosen. The literature suggests that the utility from claiming SA depends positively on the amount of the SA entitlement of the household (see, e.g., Moffitt, 1983; Blundell/Fry/Walker, 1988) . Thus, we use the simulated entitlement to SA as the most obvious proxy for utility from claiming benefits. Costs of claiming, on the other hand, can be differentiated into information costs (insufficient knowledge or the false interpretation of entitlement rules, insufficient knowledge of the claiming process or of administrative procedures) and stigma costs (fear of stigmatization, negative attitudes towards dependency on SA), see van Oorschot (1991) . We build on the existing literature in choosing proxies for costs of claiming (see Riphahn, 2001; Becker/Hauser, 2005; Wilde/Kubis, 2005; Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007; Bruckmeier/Wiemers, 2012) . See Bruckmeier/Wiemers (2011) for a discussion on the expected effects of the proxies on the utility and costs of take-up.
Assuming linear forms for the utility and costs of claiming, the probability of observing take-up (P = 1) is given by
where the vector x includes the observed characteristics that determine take-up, β = (β 1 , β 2 ) is the vector of coefficients, and b ≡ b (y, x * ) = b (x * ) − t y − y is the benefit entitlement depending on household characteristics x * , the maximum level of benefits b (x * ), earned income y and household transfers prioritized over means-tested SA, t y . Finally, the distribution function of the error term υ 1 is denoted by F (·). Assuming Gaussian errors, υ 1 ∼ N 0, σ 2 , leads to our first specification, a pooled probit model (Model 1).
Benefit entitlement b is endogenous if the unobserved factors that influence the take-up decision are correlated with earned income y and thus benefits b (y, x * ). The endogeneity of b can be taken into account by applying an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. Modeling benefits b as a linear function of x and additional instruments z,
and assuming the joint normality of the error terms υ 1 and υ 2 ,
with covariance σ 12 leads to an IV probit model, our second specification (Model 2). The potential endogeneity of b is rarely accounted for in the literature on take-up behavior. Notable exceptions are Wilde/Kubis (2005), who estimate the take-up and the labor supply equation simultaneously, as well as Whelan (2010) and Bruckmeier/Wiemers (2012), who also use the instrumental variable approach described above.
The estimation of equations (1-3) requires the choice of instruments for the benefit level. Following Bruckmeier/Wiemers (2012), we use the level of household income independent of the current choice of labor supply (including pension, widow's pension, child benefits, maternity allowance and rental income) as well as the maximum level of SGB II-/SGB XIIbenefits, excluding housing costs. 10 These instruments are determinants of the computation of the level of SA and thus satisfy the requirement that the instrument has to be correlated with the endogenous variable. Additionally, both of these instruments are arguably not correlated with the unobserved factors determining the take-up decision.
In a third specification, we further exploit the panel structure of our data and estimate a random effects (RE) probit model of benefit take-up (Model 3). In this model, the probability of take-up for household i in period t is given by
where υ it are i.i.d. Gaussian errors with mean zero and variance σ 2 υ = 1, independent of the random effects ν i , which are i.i.d. N (0, σ 2 ν ). As usual, Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. The share of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component is given by ρ = σ 2 ν / σ 2 ν + 1 . In the case of ρ = 0, the random effects model coincides with the pooled probit model. Thus, a likelihood-ratio test of ρ = 0 can be employed to formally test the pooled probit against the panel probit estimator.
The IV probit ignores the panel nature of the data, while the RE probit does not account for the potential endogeneity of the level of SA. Therefore, in a final specification, we combine both models and estimate a random effects instrumental variable (RE-IV) probit model (Model 4). The model is given by
where 1 (·) is the indicator function, z it are the additional instruments and the error terms υ 1it and υ 2it are assumed to be contemporaneously jointly normal,
and independent for t = s. As in model (4), the random effect ν i is i.i.d. N (0, σ 2 ν ) and independent from υ 1it . 11
Results
Estimation results for our four alternative specifications are presented in Table 2 . 12 In order to facilitate interpretation of the signs and magnitudes of the estimated effects, we present marginal effects calculated as the averages of the marginal effects for each household-by-year observation. 13 Table 2 : Marginal effects on probability of take-up (dependent variable). 11 We estimate model (5) using the command cmp for Stata ® , see Roodman (2011). 12 Table A2 in the appendix provides means of the covariates used in our estimations. 13 In order to examine the validity of the instruments used in the IV estimations (Model 2 and Model 4), we first test the overidentifying restrictions, since we have one instrument more than required to identify the parameters of the IV probit. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ 2 ALN statistic (Lee, 1992 ) is χ 2 ALN (1) = 0.71, which corresponds with a p-value of 0.40. Therefore, the null of both instruments being uncorrelated with the error term υ1 in (1) cannot be rejected. As an additional validity test for the instruments, we also estimate the take-up model using 2SLS (see Table A3 in the Appendix), since some validity tests (underidentification and weak instrument tests) are only available for the linear model. All tests reported in Table A3 suggest that our instruments are valid. The estimated correlation between the error terms of the IV probit equations is ρ12 = 0.13 with a cluster robust standard error of 0.11, suggesting a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between the unobservable factors which determine the probability of claiming SA and the level of the calculated benefits. Accordingly, the Wald test reported in Table 2 cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the simulated SA benefit at conventional significance levels for Model 2. In the RE-IV probit the correlation between υ1 and υ2 slightly increases to ρ12 = 0.14, but is estimated with much higher precision (standard error of 0.027). The corresponding Wald test implies rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity on the 1% level. The estimation results generally confirm our expectations about the influence of the control variables on the probability of take-up. In particular, the marginal effect of the simulated benefit implies that an increase of 100 Euro per month in SA increases the probability of take-up by approximately 7 percentage points for all estimated models. The size of this marginal effect is in line with the literature (see, e.g., Frick/Groh-Samberg, 2007; Whelan, 2010; Bruckmeier/Wiemers, 2012) . Thus, considering the endogeneity of the simulated benefit in Model 2 and Model 4 has only a small impact on the marginal effect of the benefit level on the take-up decision.
The main variable of interest is the migration status. For the pooled probit (Model 1) and the pooled IV probit (Model 2) we find a significant negative effect (10% level) on the take-up probability if the head of the household is an EU-citizen. The results from Model 1 and Model 2 imply that these households have a reduced probability of claiming their entitlements of approximately 9 percentage points. For these models we also find that being a migrant with German citizenship significantly increases the probability of take-up (5% level vor Model 1, 10% level for Model 2) by about 6 percentage points.
A comparison of the pooled Models 1 and 2 with the RE probit and RE-IV probit (Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 ) reveals the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The last row in the table shows that the proportion of the estimated total variance contributed by the individual panel-level variance component is large ( ρ = 0.72 for the RE probit and ρ = 0.71 for the RE-IV probit) and highly significant. 14 While controlling for unobserved heterogeneity does not alter the marginal effects for most regressors (both in magnitude and significance) compared to the pooled models, the significant effects for the first and the third migrant indicator in the pooled models is lost in the RE panel models (Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 compared to Models 1 and 2). A test of whether the parameters for the three subgroups of migrants are jointly zero is rejected for the pooled models (on the 5% level), while the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for Models 3 and 4.
Thus, our results imply that the propensity to take-up benefits is not related to immigrant status per se. After controlling for other factors, immigrants are no more likely to claim benefits than natives are. This result holds for all subgroups of immigrants we considered. 15 14 A likelihood-ratio test of ρ = 0 is rejected on the 1% level for Model 3 and Model 4. 15 As suggested by Hansen/Lofstrom (2003) , we also test whether there are differences in take-up between migrant cohorts (see Table A4 in the Appendix). To this end, we include dummy variables for three arrival cohorts of migrants. We define the first cohort as persons who immigrated to Germany between 1949-1967, the first wave of post-war immigration, which was dominated by turkish (at the time called) "guest workers", whose main motive of immigration was to take up work in Germany. In the next immigration cohort, which we define as the period 1968-1988, an increasing share of immigration was also motivated by joining family members already living in Germany. Our final immigration cohort starts in 1989 and is characterized by immigration from former Eastern bloc countries. The reference category for all the cohorts is "born in Germany". This specification leads to insignificant effects for all migration and cohort indicators in all models. This is arguably the result of a positive correlation between the migration and the cohort indicators. For example, approximately 75% of the migrants in the latest arrival cohort belong to the group of migrants with German citizenship. Hansen/Lofstrom (2003) additionally test the hypothesis whether there is assimilation into or out of welfare by adding the covariates "years since immigration" and "years since immigration squared" to the regressions. Because "years since immigration" is not defined for natives, the models have to be estimated for (subgroups of) immigration households only. Unfortunately, our sample size does not allow estimations for the subgroup of immigrant households.
Conclusion
We study whether immigrants in Germany differ in their take-up behavior conditional on being eligible for receiving welfare benefits relative to their German counterparts. The empirical approach aims (i) to determine eligibility for welfare benefits for a representative sample of the whole population in Germany using a microsimulation model based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and then (ii) to estimate probit models of observed welfare benefit take-up for the sample of eligible households. Our analysis differs from previous work (Castronova et al., 2001 ) in four ways. We provide first evidence on this issue after major social policy reforms were implemented in Germany, which were likely to have affected the take-up behavior of eligible individuals. We also make use of a complex microsimulation model to determine welfare entitlements and to focus on different groups of immigrants. Finally, we use a panel-data approach and take into account unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Our descriptive results show that, although there are marked and statistically significant differences in the likelihood of being eligible for social assistance, the raw rates of benefit take-up for all considered migrant groups are not significantly different from the take-up rate of natives. Furthermore, our estimation results suggest that -after controlling for observed and unobserved household characteristics -there is no significant effect of being a migrant on the probability of taking up entitlements. This result is in line with Castronova et al. (2001) . Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important when analyzing differences in takeup behavior between immigrants and natives, since a significant negative effect on the take-up probability for citizens from European countries as well as a positive effect for immigrants with German citizenship disappear after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Our findings suggest that immigrants are not more likely to take-up welfare benefits. The higher welfare rates of immigrants are therefore explained mainly by their higher risk of welfare dependence. Thus, given that reducing the welfare dependence of immigrants is a political goal, social policy measures to improve welfare recipients' labor market prospects are contested. However, restricting eligibility rules to reduce entitlements does not seem to be the appropriate measure, because the take-up probability does not differ between immigrants and natives after controlling for individual characteristics.
Whelan, Stephen (2010) Source: GSOEP, authors' own computations based on IAB-STSM. Stars denote rejection of the F-test on equal means of the migrant subgroups versus natives on the significance levels * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. HHH = head of household. The sample sizes add up to the number of observations used in the take-up estimations, 5,960. 
